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The case for tariff differentiation in the Belarusian electricity sector 
 
Executive Summary 
This study analyzes the current state of the art and potentials for tariff differentiation in the 
Belarusian electricity sector. Attempts to implement intertemporal tariff differentiation in Bela-
rus have not been successful but the benefit expected from an efficient scheme might be sig-
nificant. By reducing peak demand by 5% an efficient tariff differentiation scheme could reduce 
the annual cost of the Belarusian electricity system by USD 25-30 m. Because time-of-use de-
mand measuring is costly, we argue that targeted demand shifting incentives for a small num-
ber of big consumers (industry) would be more efficient than a general scheme in Belarus. 
The paper is organized in four parts: The concept, advantages and international experiences of 
tariff differentiation are presented in the next section. In the second section the Belarusian 
electricity sector is introduced. The third section studies the case for tariff differentiation in 
Belarus, and the fourth section concludes. 
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1. Tariff differentiation in electricity markets 
Electricity demand is characterized by high volatility and strong daily, weekly and annual sea-
sonalities. Therefore, in general the electricity consumption at the hour of highest annual elec-
tricity demand (peak load) exceeds the average load significantly. As the power plant fleet of 
an electricity system must be able to meet the peak demand plus some security margin, the 
fixed cost of an electricity system are to a large extent determined by this peak load.1  
By reducing the peak load of the system either the fixed cost of serving a given demand can 
be lowered, or demand increases can be accommodated without additional investments in new 
capacities, or security of supply can be increased without additional cost.2 Additionally, 
smoothing the load curve often allows lowering fuel and emission cost as peak power plants 
are usually characterized by below-average fuel and emission efficiency. Therefore, the aim of 
intertemporal tariff differentiation3 is to provide electricity consumers with incentives to shift 
demand from high-load to lower-load hours. In the energy economic literature, a number of 
potential contracts that provide incentives for load-shifting are discussed: 
1.1. Two-Part Tariffs 
The general idea of two-part tariffs is to charge the customer a fee for the electricity consumed 
and another fee for the maximum load they incur. The later component might depend on the 
actual maximum capacity usage, the allowed maximum capacity usage, the capacity usage 
during peak-load, or more sophisticated measures. In some cases even a third component that 
penalizes low power factors (phase between voltage and amperage) is introduced.  
1.2. Time-of-Use Pricing  
Generally electricity demand is higher on weekdays during day-time than on week-ends, holi-
days and at night. Thus, an obvious approach is to introduce separate tariffs for working and 
non-working hours. Corresponding contracts are offered even in the residential sector. Billing 
is mainly performed using two separate meters, and sometimes by obliging users to install 
separate circuits. Contracts might specify minimum and maximum capacities for both types of 
electricity. In Germany such schemes are often used for powering storage-heating devices. An 
experiment with 30% higher peak than off-peak prices resulted in a 5% reduction in peak con-
sumption in the US.4 
1.3. Critical Peak Pricing 
Critical peak pricing involves billing especially high prices during the 60-100 highest load 
hours. It does require the installation of additional equipment. This scheme, which has, inter 
alia, been implemented in the French residential sector (on an experimental base), also re-
quires that customers ex ante know when these “red hours” occur, so that they can adjust 
their behavior correspondingly. 
1.4. Real Time Pricing 
The idea of real time pricing (RTP) is that the tariff for electricity depends on an exogenous 
time-varying index. For example the tariffs might be allowed to change from hour-to-hour ac-
cording to the corresponding spot price at the power exchange. Therefore, RTP requires the 
existence of a transparent index (e.g., system-load or electricity price). Furthermore, costly 
infrastructure (real time metering, two-way communication, software, etc.) is needed for the 
roll-out of RTP. Therefore, this system is usually applied for big customers that are able to ad-
just their electricity consumption to tariff changes in real time. Nevertheless, combined with 
                                          
1 The margin should take the stochasticity of demand and the potential of supply-sided failures into ac-
count (N-1 criterion – i.e., the system could accommodate the failure of at least one unit without break-
ing down). 
2 Spees and Lave (2008), for example, estimate for PJM (the US East Coast electricity system) that 15% 
of the power plants run less than 96 hours per year (i.e., 1.1%). 
3 In this study we focus on intertemporal tariff differentiation. Other types of tariff differentiation (e.g. 
according to different location or different consumer segments like industry vs. households) are not ex-
plicitly addressed. 
4 The experiment was carried out in 2001-2003 involving 300,000 residential customers and 20,000 small 
commercial customers in Washington state  
[energypriorities.com/entries/2006/02/pse_tou_amr_case.php]. 
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certain electricity consuming devices (e.g. air conditioning, electric heating) RTP is also applied 
in the residential sector in some countries (Italy).  
1.5. Interruptible contracts 
Implementing real time pricing involves considerable investment costs. An alternative that 
costs less are interruptible contracts. In return for lower average prices, big consumers agree 
(under certain conditions) either to reduce their consumption when requested to do so by their 
supplier, or to pay a penalty. There are many such contracts, all of which try to solve the asso-
ciated moral hazard problems.5 
All competitive wholesale electricity markets (e.g. all EU and US power exchanges) feature ei-
ther hourly or half-hourly prices. Furthermore, the transmission and distribution tariffs are also 
differentiated in many countries.6 As suppliers typically purchase the electricity that they sell to 
end-consumer on these wholesale markets and pay the potentially differentiated transmis-
sion/distribution tariffs, their costs vary from hour to hour. In addition, the exact hour-by-hour 
demand of the end-consumers is usually uncertain for suppliers, although some general esti-
mates of the demand profile exist. Therefore, it is quite likely that a flat tariff for a big end-
consumer will either be too high (the consumer will choose another supplier) or too low (the 
supplier will lose money). This is especially true if one considers that an end-consumer who 
knows his flat tariff might have incentives to deviate ex post from his estimated load profile. 
Hence, if transaction costs (e.g., for metering) are sufficiently low, offering differentiated con-
tracts will provide suppliers with a competitive advantage. Therefore, in a perfect electricity 
market,7 each contract between suppliers and end-consumers should optimally balance tariff 
differentiation and the related transaction costs. Thus, in general one can observe that the 
bigger the end-consumer, the more sophisticated is the price differentiation scheme he negoti-
ates with his supplier. 
In practice, the existence of contractual freedom between suppliers and end-consumers in 
open electricity markets has led to a coexistence of all of the tariff schemes presented above. 
Due to increasing market liberalization, decreasing costs of sophisticated electronic metering 
and billing technology, and increasing experience, some suppliers are even considering intro-
ducing real-time pricing at the household level. 
2. The Belarusian electricity sector 
The Belarusian electricity sector is characterized by: 
A vertically integrated monopoly: Belarus is the only country in Europe that maintains the mo-
nopolistic structure of its electricity market without attempting to unbundled, liberalize or pri-
vatize. The vertically-integrated state-owned monopolist “BELENERGO” is under control of the 
Ministry of Energy and consolidates the six regional vertically-integrated utilities (one for each 
oblast). These regional utilities (RUE-oblenergo) operate all power plants as well as transmis-
sion and distribution networks in the corresponding region (see Figure 1). 
Tightening capacity: While today’s capacity is still sufficient (in 2007 the maximum load was 
6,200 MW and the generation capacity was 7,882 MW), the load forecasts (8,000-13,000 MW 
in 2020) as well as the fact that around 60% of the power plant fleet are worn out point to-
wards a severely tightening capacity situation (see Table 1).8 
 
                                          
5 E.g., a utility may be tempted to provoke punishment payments by its customer by declaring unneces-
sary interruptions at times the customer is unable to react. 
6 Time differentiation (hourly-seasonal) of transmission tariffs is practised by many countries. Although, 
time differentiation is implemented differently across countries and it does not apply to the same ele-
ments of the tariff. In England, for example, the capacity term is computed from the three annual higher 
values (the "triad"). Spain distinguishes between six periods, each with a different value for capacity and 
energy. In Norway, we find that each two month period has two distinct schedules (high load, low load) 
for the energy component, based on recovery of the marginal cost of losses and used to calculate losses, 
while Sweden divides each year into four periods for purposes of computing loss coefficients and charges. 
Italy distinguishes between four hourly periods, applicable to the energy component (see Glachant 
(2002)). 
7 In other words, abstracting from market imperfections such as market power and search costs. 
8 On the capital depletion see for example: Hirschhausen and Rumiantseva (2006). 
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Figure 1: Power system of the Republic of Belarus 
 
 
Table 1: Peak Load Demand Forecast, MW 
Year World Bank London Economics 
Belarus Thermal and 
Power Institute 
IAEA 
2010 9,600-10,390 6,610-8,300 9,480 8,530 
2015 10,970-11,760 7,450-9,360 10,720 9,670 
2020 12,410-13,310 8,400-10,560 12,130 10,950 
Source: IAEA (2003). 
An unbalanced power plant portfolio: Roughly 90% of Belarusian electricity generation capaci-
ties are fueled with natural gas. 
A high share of combined heat and power plants (CHP): With around 57% of total capacity, 
Belarus has one of the highest shares of CHPs in the world. While CHPs are remarkably effi-
cient in cogeneration mode, their advantage quickly vanishes outside the heating period.  
High baseload generation cost: As the efficiency of most Belarusian generation units is below 
Western standards, and prices for natural gas have increased significantly,9 average genera-
tion cost in Belarus are significantly above the regional average. At a natural gas price of USD 
200, the pure fuel cost of producing one MWh of electricity at the Beresovskaya Power plant 
amounts to 65 USD/MWh. Under the same gas price assumptions, the pure fuel cost for pro-
ducing one MWh at the Lokomlskaya power plant10 are 58 USD/MWh. Since the Beresovskaya 
(1,000 MW) and the Lokomlskaya (2,400 MW) power plants are the only big non-CHP facilities 
in the country, and together represent 46% of the Belarus generation capacity, it is most likely 
that they very often act as marginal suppliers. 
                                          
9 According to a contract with Russia, natural gas prices for Belarus are expected to increase to “Euro-
pean level minus cost of transit” by 2011. 
10 The proposal for upgrading the existing gas turbines at the Beresovskaya Power plant lists an average 
(over all 6 blocks) specific natural gas consumption of 350-353 g of coal equivalents per kWh. For the 
Lokomlskaya power plant 316 g/kWh are assumed. 
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Dependence on imports: Due to the high generation cost of its power plant fleet, Belarus opts 
to import a significant share (>10%) of its electricity consumption from Russia (62%), Lithua-
nia (21%) and Ukraine (16%). With the planned decommissioning of Lithuania’s only nuclear 
power plant Ignalina, the import situation might, however, tighten as well. 
A pronounced peak load: The Belarus peak load (6,200 MW) exceeded the average load (4,000 
MW) by almost 50%. In comparison, the peak load in Germany (78,377 MW, 07.Nov.07 
18:30) exceeded the average load (56,694 MW) by 38% (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Four Typical Belarus Load Curves 
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Regulated tariffs imply cross-subsidization: Electricity tariffs for households are under regula-
tion of the Council of Ministers; tariffs for other consumers are under regulation of the Ministry 
of Economy. Tariff rates are adopted for each group of consumers. The classification of con-
sumers for grouping has not principally changed since Soviet times. The tariff system in the 
Republic of Belarus consists only of two tariff schemes: a two-part tariff (for used electricity 
and installed capacity) for industrial enterprises with an installed capacity ≥ 750 kVA and dif-
ferent one-part tariffs for all other consumers.11 While residential consumers pay a strongly 
subsidized tariff of USD 0.0523 per kWh, industrial and commercial users usually pay approxi-
mately cost reflecting rates (USD 0.079–0.106).12 Furthermore, experimental schemes apply 
for a small number of consumers.13 
An industrialized nation’s consumption structure: The electricity consumption structure in Bela-
rus is comparable with that in Germany, with a slightly lower importance of households and a 
larger share of consumption going to the transportation industry (Table 2). 
Table 2: Consumption Structure 
 Belarus 2003 Belarus 2004 Belarus 2005 Germany 2005 
industry & construction 46% 48% 48% 45% 
transportation industry 8% 8% 8% 3% 
households 23% 22% 22% 27% 
agriculture and others 23% 22% 23% 25% 
Source: http://data.un.org. 
                                          
11 There are ten groups of consumers: (1) Industrial and equated consumers with installed capacity 750 
kVA and more; (2) Industrial and equated consumers with installed capacity less than 750 kVA; (3) Elec-
trified railway transportation; (4) Electrified urban transportation; (5) Non-industrial consumers; (6) Elec-
tricity for heating and hot water supply; (7) Electricity for industrial needs of agricultural consumers; (8) 
Electricity for auxiliaries of the power engineering; (9) Urban households; (10) Rural households. 
12 The tariff policy and regulation system in the Belarusian energy sector is inefficient and outdated. The 
current state, main problems and prospects of the tariff policy are discussed in: Padalko and Zaborovskiy 
(2008). 
13 http://www.lawbelarus.com/repub/sub06/texb0241.htm. See also part 3 of the paper. 
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3. The case for price differentiation in Belarus 
In the following we analyze whether tariff differentiation would be desirable for Belarus, given 
the characteristics of the Belarusian electricity sector discussed above. As laid out in Part 1, 
tariff differentiation schemes are set up to provide consumers with incentives to shift demand 
from high-load to low-load hours. The final aim of such a strategy is twofold: first, lowering 
fuel and emission cost; and second, reducing the fixed cost of the power generation and 
transmission system. In the following we provide an illustrative analysis of the potential bene-
fits of a five percent peak load reduction with respect to both aims. 
3.1. Lowering fuel and emission costs 
In a system with a homogenous production structure, electricity by definition is always pro-
duced by the same technology.14 As the current Belarusian electricity system comes close to 
such an ‘idealized’ situation, no significant gains from tariff differentiation would be expected. 
This is, however, only true if one ignores the considerable electricity imports as well as the in-
tended extensions and modernizations of the Belarusian power plant fleet. To resolve tighten-
ing capacity, the Belarusian administration is planning to build a nuclear power plant, to ex-
tend the use of renewables, and to increase imports from Russia and Ukraine (at least in the 
interim). The marginal costs of these three options will be below the marginal cost of the cur-
rent Belarusian power generation system (see Table 3).  
Table 3: Marginal cost of electricity in USD/MWh 
Domestic generation Nuclear Wind/Hydro Imports from Russia Imports from Ukraine 
55-65 1 10-20 2 0 40-48 3 <50 3 
Notes. This are estimates of the pure marginal cost of producing one MWh of electricity. Consequently, 
investment, maintenance or labor costs are not included. 
1 see Footnote 10. In the cases, where CHPs are marginal in condensing mode, marginal cost might be 
substantially higher and reach 70 USD/MWh, in cogeneration mode marginal costs of CHPs are about 26 
USD/MWh. 
2 Energywatchgroup (2007). 
3 according to IPM Research Center. 
Under these conditions, shifting each MWh away from peak hours (where the existing expen-
sive generation units will continue to run) to off-peak hours (where imports, nuclear power and 
renewables represent the marginal units) could save approximately USD 10-30 per MWh. Nev-
ertheless, the potential fuel cost savings are rather unimpressive: shifting 5% of the load at 
the three highest load hours would provide savings of around USD 16,000 per day15 or USD 
5.8 m per year. However, in addition to the pure fuel cost, CO2 emissions could also be re-
duced. If the 5% peak demand reduction would result in shifting the entire corresponding gen-
eration from natural gas (emission intensity of 0.4 t/MWh) to quasi emission free baseload 
generation (nuclear, renewables) the emission reductions could reach 116,000 tonnes of CO2 
per year.16 In this rather overoptimistic case,17 and at an emission certificate price of USD 20 
the savings would amount to around USD 2 m per year. Furthermore, assuring constant load 
for the nuclear power plant and the non-controllable renewables in off-peak periods is an addi-
tional argument for load smoothing. Finally, Belarus might want to establish itself as a peak 
electricity producer in the region, exporting its peakload production at the corresponding high 
price18 to its baseload dominated neighbors. 
3.2. Reducing the fixed cost of the power generation and transmission system 
Providing consumers with incentives to shift demand is a cornerstone of a least cost approach 
to the challenges faced by the Belarusian electricity sector. If projected demand growth (Table 
1) materializes, Belarus will have to construct significant generation capacities. Most of the 
                                          
14 In a system consisting of only one type of power plant, marginal costs will only depend on load if indi-
vidual power plants are characterized by increasing or decreasing efficiencies of scale (usually, a power 
plant has an optimal load factor). 
15 3 h/day x 5,300 MWh/h x 5% x 20 USD/MWh = 15,900 USD/day. 
16 365 d/a x 3 h/day x 5,300 MWh/h x 5% x 0.4 t/MWh = 116,070 t/a. 
17 Some of the shifted generation will still be produced in Belarusian natural gas power plants, others 
might even be imported from the more emission intensive Ukrainian coal power plants. 
18 To our knowledge, load-period differentiated prices for exports and imports do not exist currently. 
  9 
new generation will have to be baseload producers (i.e., high investment and low fuel cost) but 
also the existing worn out peak-load generation will have to be modernized or replaced. When 
evaluating the cost of peak units, in addition to investment costs, labor, maintenance and 
other fixed costs have to be considered as well. According to the assumed annualized capacity 
costs in Table 4, natural gas power plants will be selected as peak units. Consequently, the ef-
fects of reducing the peak load can roughly estimated based on the annualized capacity cost of 
natural gas power plants. A reduction of peak load by 5 % (5% x 5300 MW = 265 MW) would 
reduce the annual cost of power plant capacity by USD 21 m. In addition, costs of ancillary 
services as well as the cost of potentially necessary transmission system extensions would also 
be reduced. Finally, the introduction of tariff differentiation often induces customers to care-
fully review their electricity consumption behavior resulting in the detection of additional sav-
ing possibilities19. 
Table 4: Assumed annualized capacity cost of one kW 
Nuclear Natural Gas Hard Coal 
USD 270 USD 80 USD 150 
Note. This table gives a rough approximation of annualized investment (interest=10%), maintenance and 
labor cost deduced from the collection of cost-figures in Öko Institut (1998).20 
3.3. The cost of metering 
Currently, most meters used for smaller consumers in Belarus do not have time-of-use meter-
ing capabilities. Time-of-use metering is, however, needed for price differentiation. The cost of 
improving metering equipment is relatively high. Table 5 shows some estimates of meter costs 
as a function of the meter’s capabilities and the scale of its use. Due to its high cost as well as 
the limited price response capabilities of households, the installation of two-rate meters cannot 
at present be justified for the residents of urban apartment buildings with central heating, hot 
water and a standard set of household electric appliances.21  
Table 5: Cost of metering equipment 
Meter Type  Functions Unit Cost for 
100 Consumers 
Unit Cost for 
50,000 Consumers 
Meter Modifications Limited AMR* 175-300 75-300 
Existing Electronic Meters AMR* Load Profiling 250 100 
Advanced ‘Smart’ Meters AMR* Load Profiling Time-
of-use Control 
600 500 
Note. AMR* = Automated Meter Reading. 
Source: IEA (2001). 
4. Implementation of intertemporal tariff differentiation in Belarus: lessons learned 
In recent years Belarus implemented experimental tariff differentiation schemes for a small 
number of customers. But these experiments did not produce the expected results. Less elec-
tricity consumption than anticipated was shifted away from peak hours while the associated 
cost for the electricity utilities was higher than predicted. Although the system is still running, 
only a small number of consumers participate and consequently the impact on overall electric-
ity consumption is very limited. The schemes of intertemporal tariff differentiation tested in 
Belarus and results obtained during the experiments are described in this section of the paper.  
4.1. Two-part differentiated tariff 
Introduced in 2002 this tariff scheme has been applied on a limited number of electricity con-
sumers. In contrast to the simple two-part tariff the differentiated tariff contains a reducing 
coefficient (ka) to the load component and differentiated coefficients to the electricity compo-
nent.22 The differentiated coefficients for the electricity component are defined for three time 
                                          
19 Studies (e.g., US DOE (2006)) also show that customers who are provided with more timely and/or 
more granular (e.g., hourly) information about their energy use will conserve energy. 
20 For detailed cost estimates of a Belarusian nuclear power plant, see Hirschhausen and Rumiantseva 
(2006). 
21 See Varnavskii (1994). 
22 This tariff scheme was developed by Boris V. Pekelis and approved by the Ministry of Energy. To our 
best knowledge no corresponding publication exists. 
  10 
zones: night (kn), semi-peak (ksp) and peak (kp). Consequently, the total fee according to the 
two-part differentiated tariff (TFd) can be written as:  
)(max pp
sp
sp
n
nfad WkWkWkbPkaTF ⋅+⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅= , 
with a being the load component of the two-part tariff, Pfmax the actual capacity usage during 
peak-load hours, b the electricity component of the two-part tariff and Wn, Wsp, Wp the elec-
tricity consumed during the night (11 p.m. – 6 a.m.), semi-peak (6 a.m. – 8 a.m. and 11 a.m. 
– 11 p.m.) and peak time (8 a.m. – 11 a.m.). The coefficients were laid down by Minenergo 
(see Table 6). The motivation behind this set of coefficients is unknown to the authors as cor-
responding explanations are unavailable. 
The implementation of the presented tariff differentiation scheme took place on a voluntary 
basis.23 The self-selection of the participants caused economic losses for the energy companies 
as almost only customers with load profiles that assured lower tariffs under the experimental 
scheme switched to those contracts. Customers with strong on-peak consumption by contrast 
did mostly not switch as most of them were unable/unwilling to offset the higher peak prices 
by shifting demand. The situation can be illustrated at a real-world example with two consum-
ers with different load profiles. The first consumer has a relatively smooth electricity consump-
tion while the second customer faces a pronounced on-peak electricity consumption. 
Table 6: Tariff Coefficients as set by Minenergo 
ka 0.5 
ksp 1.0 
kn 
* ~ 0.78 
kp 
* ~ 2.09 
Note. * see FN 24 
As illustrated in Table 7 the first consumer profits from switching the tariff scheme without any 
changes in his mode of consumption. As he could easily save BYR 33 bn or almost 5% of his 
monthly bill he will certainly switch. By contrast, the second customer would increase its 
monthly electricity bill by BYR 13.75 bn or almost 10.6% if he would switch the tariff scheme 
without changing its consumption behavior. Consequently he would only participate in the ex-
perimental scheme if he could inexpensively shift his consumption.  
Table 7: Example - Monthly Tariffs for two Customers with Different Load Profiles 
 Customer 1 Customer 2 
Wn 3.604 m kWh (35%) 0.074 m kWh (5%) 
Wsp  6.292 m kWh (60%) 0.89 m kWh (60%) 
Wp 0.52 m kWh (5%) 0.52 m kWh (35%) 
Pf
max 6000 kW 6000 kW 
Old two-part tariff BYR 674.8 m BYR 130.0 m 
Experimental differentiated two-part tariff BYR 641.8 m  BYR 143.7 m 
But the observed losses for the electricity companies associated with the experimental scheme 
were not only caused by the self-selection of the participants. Other main problems were: 
− Weak methodological base of tariff coefficient selection: Both, the reduction coefficient for 
the capacity component and the differentiated coefficients for the electricity component 
were set without obvious economic reasoning. 
− All customers treated homogenously: As the load profile of the customers prior to the ex-
periment played no role in the tariff setting significant windfall profits for certain custom-
ers (with low peak consumption) arose. 
                                          
23 In fact, the Ministry of Energy required that participation in the scheme was on a purely voluntary ba-
sis. 
24 The values for kn and kp were set according to 
))()((
)4(
1 22
pn
npa
n ttdb
ttka
k −⋅⋅
−⋅⋅⋅−=  and 
))()((
)4(
1 22
pn
pna
p ttdb
ttka
k −⋅⋅
−⋅⋅⋅+= with 
d being number of days in the settlement period. The presented coefficients correspond to the values at 
the beginning of the experiment (December 2002). 
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− Annual seasonality of the Belarusian load curve is ignored: The duration and time of the 
night, semi-peak and peak zones do not take into account annual seasonality of the Bela-
rusian load curve. In winter and in summer time of the peak load differs significantly. 
As a result the proposed tariff differentiation scheme has not created incentives to switch de-
mand from high-load to lower-load hours. Some changes introduced in the proposed scheme 
after 2006 restricted its implementation and actually stopped the experiment. 
4.2. Two-part interval differentiated tariff 
This scheme was introduced in 2005 and intended to implement a new approach to intertem-
poral tariff differentiation taking into account the problems revealed during the experiment 
with the two-part differentiated tariff. 25 The interval differentiated tariff implements real-time 
pricing by linking the electricity component of the two-part tariff to the individual deviation 
from the system load curve. The total fee paid by the consumer using the two-part interval dif-
ferentiated tariff is calculated according to [ ] WTbTPaTF bbfid ⋅−⋅−++⋅= )1()(max δ , where 
Tb is a uniform base-load tariff for all consumers and δ an individual deviation index. For each 
day δ measures the deviations of the individual customers load profile from the system load 
profile.26 The value of δ lies between -1 (optimal, i.e. individual consumption mirrors the sys-
tem load curve) and 1 (worst, i.e. individual consumption parallel to the system load curve). 
Despite the half-hourly time resolution and the sophisticated deviation index the results of this 
experiment were not impressive with respect to contracts switched and electricity consumption 
shifted. Several reasons for this setback could be identified: 
− Relatively low shifting incentives: According to the values for the deviation index (δ) the 
differentiated part of the tariff scheme ranges between a minimum value of Тb (if δ = 1) 
and a maximum of 2b - Тb (if δ = -1). Therefore, the max to min ratio (2·(b/ Тb) – 1) is 
not very high. Consumers have not changed the mode of consumption significantly be-
cause the difference between the electricity component of the two-part tariff and the dif-
ferentiated rate of the two-part interval differentiated tariff was insignificant in case of 
typical industrial mode of electricity consumption. 
− Voluntary participation: Again, participation in this scheme has been on a voluntary basis. 
Due to the voluntary approach the problem of self selection described for the two-part 
differentiated tariff might have also been present for the two part interval differentiated 
tariff. But, as the scheme failed to attract any participants a small number of state-owned 
enterprises was finally forced to take part in this tariff scheme experiment.  
− Weak economic foundation of tariff coefficient selection: Like in the case of the two-part 
differentiated tariff developed scheme does not give the basics for the correct tariff rates 
selection. It concerns, first of all, the setting of the base-load tariff (Tb) formation. Due to 
the political control over this variable Tb does neither reflect variable nor marginal costs 
of base-load power generation.  
4.3. Time-zones differentiated tariff 
In response to unsuccessful attempts to implement an efficient tariff differentiation scheme 
and taking into account the difficulties observed during the previous experiments a new 
                                          
25 This tariff scheme was worked out in Zabello (1985) and adapted by E. P. Zabello for the Ministry of 
Energy of Belarus that approved it in 2005. 
26 The deviation index δ is calculated according to ∑
=
=
48
1t
tλδ  with 48,...,1,
48
1
48
1
=∀
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
<−
>−
= t
IifII
IifII
es
t
es
t
cs
t
es
t
cs
t
es
t
tλ , 
where 
∑∑
==
== 48
1
48
1
;
t
cs
t
cs
tcs
t
t
es
t
es
tes
t
P
PI
P
PI  with 
es
tP the load of the energy system in time t and 
cs
tP  the load of the 
consumer in time t. 
  12 
scheme of intertemporal tariff differentiation was submitted to the Ministry of Energy – the 
time-zones differentiated tariff.27 The basics of this tariff are: 
− An individual approach to tariff formation for every consumer; 
− A balance condition for tariff rates to guarantee the equality of payment before and after 
a consumer switched to the new tariff (given no consumption behavior changes take 
place); 
− The introduction of three floating (in accordance with seasonal factors) time zones for 
night, semi-peak and peak; 
− A tariff formation based on economic fundamentals. That is, tariff rates take into account 
marginal costs of electricity generation of base-load, semi-peak-load and peak-load ca-
pacities and long-run marginal costs of power plant construction. 
The total fee paid by the consumer using the time-zone differentiated tariff is calculated ac-
cording to: pp
sp
sp
n
nz WWWTF ⋅+⋅+⋅= τττ , with pspn τττ ,, the tariff rates for the night, semi-
peak and peak time zones as well as Wn, Wsp, Wp the corresponding electricity consumption. 
The tariff rates for the night, semi-peak and peak time zones are set to represent the corre-
sponding generation cost.28 A balance equation guarantees that the total payment before and 
after time-zones tariff implementation is identical if the consumer does not change its con-
sumption behavior. The implementation of the described approach leads to different tariff rates 
for each month of the year because of difference in the marginal costs of electricity production 
and duration of the peak time zone. Tariff rates for each time-zone are calculated by the en-
ergy supplier and results are specified in the contract with the consumer for the settlement pe-
riod. Duration, beginning and finishing time of night, semi-peak and peak zones are specified 
in the contract as well. 
The tariff rates of the time-zones differentiated tariff for a typical industrial consumer for dif-
ferent months of the year are presented in Figure 3. The max to min tariff ratio is substantial 
for the proposed tariff scheme and gives good incentives for demand shifting. In June for ex-
ample the peak tariff rate is 5.5 times higher than the night rate and 2.3 times higher than the 
semi-peak rate. 
The most sticking shortcomings of the described scheme are: 
− Comparatively high transaction cost for both the consumer and supplier. The time-zones 
differentiated tariff has to be calculated and specified for each consumer based on its 
electricity consumption. Because of fuel prices adjustments the tariff has to be regularly 
updated. This procedure is not very complicated but requires recalculation of the tariff 
rates for each consumer. 
                                          
27 The foundations of this scheme were worked out in Verzhbickiy and Padalko (1983). The scheme was 
adapted for the Ministry of Energy of Belarus by Leonid P. Padalko and Alexander M. Zaborovskiy. The 
latest variant is represented here. 
28 Tariff rate for the peak time zone exceeds the night tariff rate by the marginal costs difference plus 
long-run marginal costs of generating capacity construction. It is calculated according to: 
p
np
np h
EkMC ⋅+Δ+= −ττ , with npMC −Δ  the difference between marginal costs of peak and base electricity 
generation, k the generation capacity investment costs, E the accepted rate of return (daily updated) on 
investing capital and hp the duration of the peak time zone (h). The tariff rate for the semi-peak time 
zone exceeds the night tariff rate by the marginal costs difference. It is calculated according to 
nsp
np MC
−Δ+=ττ , with nspMC −Δ  the difference between marginal costs of semi-peak and base electricity 
generation. Finally, the tariff rate for the night time zone is derived from 
csp
p
np
n
spnsp
n
n
n TFWh
EkMCWMCW =⋅⋅+Δ++⋅Δ++⋅ −− )()( τττ  where csTF  is the total fee paid by the consumer 
before the time-zones tariff implementation. 
  13 
Figure 3: Tariff rates of the time-zones differentiated tariff for a typical industrial 
consumer (USct/kWh) 
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− Different prices for same consumption. From a fairness point of view it is bewildering that 
for the same consumption a consumer with high on-peak consumption in the last period 
has to pay a substantially lower price than another consumer with a lower historic con-
sumption. This translates into a continued cross-subsidy for consumer with high on-peak 
demand in the first period.  
− Distortion of Competition. Due to the described tariff scheme, newly entrant electricity 
consuming enterprises might face significantly higher electricity prices than existing ones 
in the same sector. This “protection” of old companies distorts competition and might be 
inefficient from an economic point of view.  
− Susceptible to strategic behavior. The calculation of tariffs based on the initial consump-
tion gives incentives to inflate the initial peak consumption to profit from lower electricity 
prices in all subsequent periods.  
But it has to be noted, that it is exactly due to the highlighted cross-subsidies that described 
scheme gives incentives to existing peak-load consumer to switch contracts and shift con-
sumption on a voluntary basis. Therefore, if the Belarusian government hesitates to introduce 
intertemporal price differentiation measures that might hurt some (peak load) consumer; the 
time-zones differentiated tariff might represent a feasible second best alternative. 
4.4. Lessons Learned 
Almost 7 years of experiments in Belarus have shown that effectively implementing intertem-
poral tariff differentiation is rather difficult in a vertically integrated state-owned electricity in-
dustry. The absence of a competitive wholesale market that provides reliable and timely price 
signals (on marginal generation cost) prevents the introduction of most of the schemes suc-
cessfully implemented in Western countries (e.g. real time pricing or critical peak pricing). If in 
addition policy seeks to protect existing peak-load consumer from higher cost by opposing in-
creasing flat rate prices and demanding a voluntary approach all known tariff differentiation 
approaches are bound to fail.  
4.5. Selection of a tariff differentiation scheme 
The introduction of a feasible tariff differentiation scheme entails three main methodological 
challenges: 
− Select a scheme suitable for the Belarusian electricity sector; 
− Calculating the differentiated tariffs. Taking into account that unbundling is absent in ver-
tically-integrated energy utilities, capacities are unevenly distributed among regions and 
timely information on long-run marginal cost is unavailable it is quite difficult to calculate 
the economically sound tariffs; 
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− Evaluate the peak-load reductions. Because of the significant number of driving factors 
for electricity demand it is very difficult to asses quantitatively the peak load reductions 
due to an intertemporal tariff differentiation scheme. Such an evaluation, however, is 
necessary to obtain the described benefits because such information is needed for adjust-
ing long term generation investments. 
In open electricity markets, efficient tariff differentiation schemes are found through the con-
test of competing approaches. Because in Belarus a competitive electricity market is currently 
not in sight, it is hard to predict which tariff differentiation scheme would produce the optimal 
balance between peak-load reduction and increased transaction costs. Furthermore, the price 
responsiveness of Belarusian consumers, an important input for designing a tariff differentia-
tion scheme, cannot be estimated as no transparent market exists.  
In general, there is no one-size-fits-all solution because the relative impact of transaction costs 
(that increase with the complexity of the individual contract) decreases with the volume of the 
deal. For example, real-time-metering for one big customer is cheaper than installing thou-
sands of time-of-use meters for residential consumer. Moreover, studies from other countries 
indicate that the price responsiveness of industrial consumer is higher than that of households. 
This is most likely to be the case in Belarus as well, because Belarusian households have only 
limited possibilities to shift load.29 Furthermore, industrial customers represent a high share of 
peak electricity consumption and could certainly be provided with incentives to shift their con-
sumption away from the early (9:00-10:00) and the late (17:00-18:00) peaks. Finally, for po-
litical reasons the Belarusian administration currently seems unwilling to confront residential 
electricity customers with market-near (or even time-varying) prices. 
Consequently, we propose that introducing a well-designed and transparent tariff differentia-
tion scheme especially targeted for medium and large customers is the most viable option. In 
this context, special attention should be paid to the long-term commitment to such a scheme. 
Otherwise customers would not commit to invest in long-term peak-load saving technologies 
that account for a substantial part of the overall load shifting.30  
One important question for the introduction of a tariff differentiation scheme is the mode of 
implementation with respect to existing contracts. Different options exist: 
− Implementation of intertemporal differentiated tariffs on a voluntary basis: To avoid that 
the self-selection of participants leads to high windfall profits for typical baseload custom-
ers without significant change in their consumption pattern this option requires the im-
plementation of a sophisticated tariff scheme. The scheme should assure that for each 
consumer in the differentiated scheme the total payments before and after the switching 
are identical. 
− Implementation of intertemporal differentiated tariffs on a mandatory basis: This option 
has not been tested in Belarus because of lacking political acceptance as well as difficul-
ties with the ex ante evaluation of the expected outcomes. 
− Implementation of intertemporal differentiated tariffs on an economic basis: The present 
cross subsidization of peak load customers (at the cost of off-peak load customers) could 
be avoided by significantly increasing the price for the undifferentiated tariff (it should be 
close to the marginal cost of peak-load generation). Then, most customers would switch 
to the differentiated scheme (with lower off-peak prices). Political acceptance for such a 
scheme however is uncertain, as it will produce winners (base load consumer) and losers 
(peak load consumer). 
− “Phase-in” approach: This approach intends to make transition for peak-load consumer 
smooth and allow them to adapt to the higher cost. The tariff differentiation is introduced 
in predefined steps sequentially increasing the difference between off-peak and peak 
prices. 
                                          
29 Small customers have only few possibilities to shape peaks (e.g. low penetration of dish washers and 
air conditioning). Thus, strong incentives for shaping would require enormous mark-ups. Furthermore, 
too low night-electricity prices might promote the spreading of electricity storage-heating as a substitute 
for central heating. This would represent a threat to the CHP-system. 
30 The corresponding process optimization is characterized by significant initial investments in hardware 
and software (e.g., the corresponding SAP modul). 
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We suggest that the phase-in of the selected tariff differentiation scheme might be the best 
option to combine a smooth transition (without significant political resistance) and a sustain-
able long-term solution. If, however, existing consumer should be protected against rising 
prices at all cost, the implementation of tariff differentiation on a voluntary basis (as proposed 
by Padalko and Zaborovskiy; see Time Zone Differentiated Tariff) is an efficiency increasing 
second best solution.31 
A final evaluation of tariff differentiation schemes goes beyond the scope of this paper. Such 
an evaluation would require a detailed analysis of electricity sector data that can only be car-
ried out in close cooperation with the major electricity utilities and industry representatives. 
Despite the caveat that the selection of a tariff differentiation scheme requires careful com-
parison of all available options, we want to provide one example, how such a scheme for Bela-
rus might look like:  
Due to good international experiences, relatively low cost and political feasibility, critical peak 
pricing might represent a promising approach. To account for differences between medium and 
big customers a graduated scheme might for example consist of two groups: 
− Mandatory two-part tariff with time-of-use pricing for all consumers above a certain 
threshold (e.g., 10 MWh/a). The time-of-use difference should be successively increased 
from zero up to values representing the marginal cost difference. 
− Voluntary critical-peak pricing with slightly lower electricity rates for all consumer willing 
to pay for the corresponding equipment. 
5. Conclusion 
Tariff differentiation could be a cornerstone of a least cost approach to the challenges faced by 
the Belarusian electricity sector. Assuming a 5% reduction of the peak-load through tariff dif-
ferentiation, Belarus could annually save USD 25-30 m in capacity and fuel costs. Furthermore, 
a number of additional benefits that are difficult to quantify would arise: (1) reduction of ancil-
lary services costs, (2) reduction of spending on transmission system extensions, (3) rising 
electricity consumption awareness that induces additional electricity savings, (4) reduction of 
CO2 emissions, (5) assuring constant load for the nuclear power plant and renewables in off-
peak periods, and finally, (6) price differentiation might serve as a political tool to implement 
important reforms such as reducing cross-subsidisation and direct subsidies, as well as in-
creasing collection rates. 
This paper does not intend to provide an optimal differentiation scheme for Belarus. Neverthe-
less certain issues related to the implementation of tariff-differentiation schemes should be 
kept in mind: (1) a long term commitment to the selected scheme is essential, (2) tariff differ-
entiation for Belarusian households should not be prioritized and (3) maintaining the flat tariff 
implies subsidizing peak-load consumer at the expense of all other customers and distorts 
competition. 
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